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OIL AND GAS-THE

REASONABLE NECESSITY LIMITATION EXTENDS To
THE SUPERADJACENT AIR SPACE AND THE REASONABLENESS OF A SURFACE USE

By

THE LESSEE

Is To

BE DETERMINED

By A

CONSIDERA-

TION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF BOTH THE MINERAL LESSEE AND

Is NOT A
To THE SURFACE OWNER. Getty Oil
Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372 (May 26, 1971), opinion
on motion for rehearing, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 484 (July 28, 1971).
THE OWNER OF THE SURFACE ESTATE, BUT THE ISSUE
QUESTION OF INCONVENIENCE

Plaintiff, surface owner of a tract of land, installed an automatic
irrigation system which consisted of pipe supported at a height of
seven feet above the ground by a series of steel towers which rotated
around a pivot point. Defendant oil and gas lessee had previously installed several wells and all contained some type of pumping unit.
Defendant installed pumping units in two additional wells located upon
this land. Each pumping unit exceeded seven feet in height at the top
of its upstroke thereby interfering with plaintiff's irrigation system.,
Plaintiff contended that the use of the vertical air space was unreasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiff alleged that there were reasonable alternatives available to the defendant as to the type of pumping
units to be used and that this fact could properly be considered in
determining whether defendant's use of the surface was reasonably
necessary. Defendant argued that it had a right to exclusive use of the
superadjacent air space above the limited surface area occupied by the
pumps and that only the lateral surface of the land should be subject
to the established rule of reasonable necessity. Defendant further contended that its action was reasonable in accomplishing the purposes of
the oil and gas lease, thereby giving it an absolute right to use the
surface and the air above. The issue presented to the supreme court
was whether evidence may be entertained to show the effect of the
defendant's manner of surface use upon the use of the surface by plaintiff, together with the nature of alternatives available to defendant
Getty in resolving the issue of what was reasonably necessary. The trial
court granted defendant Getty's motion of judgment non obstante
veredicto on the ground there was no evidence that Getty used more
lateral surface than reasonably necessary. The San Antonio Court of
Civil Appeals 2 held that vertical as well as lateral space was restricted
lGetty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 373 (May 26, 1971). Plaintiff's
irrigation system could negotiate most obstacles less than seven feet in height. There were
six of these pivot points located throughout plaintiff's tract. If the wells had been located
outside the circumference of the closest pivot point, no interference would have occurred.
Getty's wells were located within the circumference of the pivot points, however; thus, the
circular movement of the irrigation system was prevented from operating when Getty's
pumping units were made to exceed seven feet in height.
2 Jones v. Getty Oil Company, 458 S.W.2d 93 (rex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970), aff'd
14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372 (May 26, 1971).
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to that which is reasonably necessary. The court remanded the case,
however, holding that the trial court had erroneously instructed the
jury. Held-Affirmed. The "reasonable necessity" limitation extends
to the superadjacent air space and the reasonableness of a surface use
by the lessee is to be determined by a consideration of the circumstances
of both the mineral lessee and the owner of the surface estate, but the
issue is not a question of inconvenience to the surface owner.
Tort liability results from the breach of a duty and the relationship
of the parties must be examined in order to define the nature of the
duty to be observed. 3 When damage occurs upon or to the premises
leased for oil and gas purposes, a general principle employed by the
courts as a starting point to determine liability is that the mineral
lease creates and vests in the lessee the dominant estate in the surface
4
of the land for the purposes of the lease.
Courts look to the law of implied easements to determine the oil and
gas lessee's rights when there occurs a conflict between him and the
surface owner as to a surface use. 5 The owner of the mineral estate
acquires a mineral easement, or the right, which is necessary for his
enjoyment of the mineral estate, to use the surface of the land.6 The
reason for the existence of the rule granting an implied easement to
the oil and gas lessee is that if it were not for the implied easement the
lessee's right to produce oil and gas would, in actuality, be no right at
7
all and would be worth little.
The extent of the easement in the surface estate which the mineral
lessee acquires depends upon the purpose of the mineral grant.8 The
intention of the parties is the deciding factor in determining the
scope of the easement. In determining the intention of the parties,
the purpose or purposes of the grant and its language must be considered along with the condition and situation of the parties and the
3 Keeton and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAS L. Rlv. 1
(1956); 43 Tiox. JUR. 2d Oil and Gas § 561 (1963).
4 Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954). See also Keeton and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 2 (1956).
The principal case uses this as its starting point, also. Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372 (May 26, 1971). Sometimes the rule is stated conversely, i.e., "the
surface estate is servient to the mineral estate for the purposes of the mineral grant."
Currey v. Ingram, 397 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5 Comment, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Leasee, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 889 (1959).
6 Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 47 S.W.2d 265 (1932). See also Browder,
The Dominant Oil and Gas Estate-Master or Servant of the Servient Estate, 17 Sw. L.J.
25 (1963).
7 Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943).
8 Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, 243 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, no writ). See

also Simmons, Recent Interpretations of Oil and Gas Lease Provisions, 6 BAYLOR L. REV.
291 (1954). An example of the lessee's right which is implied so far as necessary to a full
enjoyment of the grant made is the right of ingress and egress and the erection of structures on the land for purposes of drilling and other operations. See Stephens County v.
Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923); Texas Co. v. Daugherty.
107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
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nature of the subject matter. The above particulars can be summarized
by the broad statement that the surface easement whether it be express
or implied9 extends to whatever may be reasonably necessary to the
proper enjoyment of the mineral estate.' 0 The mineral lessee has no
right to use the surface where such use is unnecessary or done in a
negligent manner.", But the lessee is permitted to occupy as much space
and do such damage as is reasonably necessary to conduct the operations permitted by the lease.' 2 No duty to restore the surface is implied after a reasonable use.' 3 Thus, in the absence of lease provisions
to the contrary, damage done by the mineral lessee to the surface estate
are damnum absque injuria if they are reasonable, not negligent and
4
incidental to his development of the leased premises.'
There is no precise rule which determines the extent of the surface
which may be used by the mineral lessee. The determination of whether
a particular use is reasonable or not is a question of fact for the jury
once the trial court determines that reasonable minds might differ
about the particular conduct in issue.1 5
Although it is generally recognized that a mineral lessee has an
implied easement to use as much of the surface estate as is reasonably
necessary, this implication may be negatived by the lease itself and the
lease governs in each case. 16 Most leases include in the granting clause
some general statement of the mineral lessee's rights which may be
exercised in developing the leased premises and the problem then be9 Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Sup. 1967);
Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410, 412 (1954); Finder v.
Stanford, 351 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ).
1OCarroll v. Roger Lacy, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 307, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson v. Back, 378 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, no
writ).
11 Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 86, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (1961); Texaco Inc. v. Joffrion,
363 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12 Keeton and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TExAs L. REV. 1
(1956). Generally, it is immaterial whether the damage was accidentally or intentionally
caused. See generally Mid-Texas Petroleum Co. v. Colcord, 235 S.W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1921, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Examples of the lessee's rights in the surface include
the right to drill where he pleases, governed by reasonableness, Gulf Oil Corporation v.
Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958, no writ), and build any
structures necessary to his operations. Joyner v. Dearing & Sons, 112 S.W.2d 1109, 1111
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1937, no writ).
13 Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957).
14 See Lambert, Surface Rights of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 381
(1958).
15 Moore v. Decker, 220 S.W. 773 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, opinion adopted); Joyner v.
Dearing & Sons, 112 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1937, no writ).
16Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co. of Texas, 117 Tex. 439, 6
S.W.2d 1039 (1928); Texaco, Inc. v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 43 TEx. JuR. 2d Oil and Gas § 562 (1963); Browder,
The Dominant Oil and Gas Estate-Master or Servant of the Servient Estate, 17 Sw. L.J.
25 (1963); Keeton and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAS L. REV.
1 (1956); Comment, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 TExAs L. REV. 889
(1959).
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comes one of determining whether the use attempted is specifically
allowed by the lease or is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes
thereof.' 7 Express lease provisions can broaden or limit the implied
rights of the lessee.'8 The effect of the lease upon the respective rights
of the parties is to determine the extent of the mineral lessee's implied
easement. Consideration should be given to the terms contained in the
lease,' 9 the purpose or purposes of the grant, 20 and the relative condition of the parties when an action is sought to be enjoined.2 ' The
most important element in the case is to determine whether the lease
22
itself provides for the particular act or use in question.
The "due regard" concept is also involved with the dominantservient relationship and the rule of reasonable necessity. Although
it is said that the lessee's estate is the dominant estate, most courts add
that the rights of the mineral lessee in the use of the surface must be
exercised with due regard for the rights of the owner of the surface
estate. 23 The "due regard" concept is frequently mentioned by the
24
courts, but it is infrequently observed.
17 See 4 SUMMERPS, OIL AND GAS § 652 (1962); Lambert, Surface Rights of the Oil and Gas

Lessee, 11 OKLA. L. Rav. 373 (1958).
18 Express lease provisions usually enlarge upon the otherwise implied rights of the oil
and gas lessee. Keeton and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAS
L. Rxv. 1 (1956).
19 Texaco, Inc. v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
20 Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 86, 344 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961); Warren Petroleum
Corporation v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 481, 304 S.W.2d 862, 363 (1957).
21 Cf. Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953,
no writ); Joyner v. Dearing & Sons, 112 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1937, no
writ).
22 The importance of determining whether the use is granted by the lease or not is
pointed out by the following quotation: "The question of reasonableness of the use by
the lessor is not involved where the lease contract grants that same use to the lessee. A
lessor cannot grant the right to use the premises for a specific purpose, and then ask the
courts to authorize him to reasonably use the premises for the same purpose." United
North & South Oil Co. v. Mercer, 286 S.W. 652, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1926, no
writ). In Justice McGee's own words: "This case is simple. Getty claims the right to place
pumping units on the top of its well sites to a height necessary to effectuate the purposes
By the terms of the lease, Getty has the right to utilize the air space to
of its lease ....
a height above its well sites as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
oil and gas lease." Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 377 (May 26,
1971). The point the dissent makes is that the court is rewriting the oil and gas lease
which was of record when Jones purchased the property, thereby deciding contrary to the
intention of the original parties. Id. at 378.
The majority states: "The oil and gas lease grants Getty the land 'for the purpose of
investigating, exploring, prospecting, drilling and mining for and producing oil, gas and
all other minerals, laying pipelines, building roads, tanks, power stations, telephone lines,
houses for its employees, and other structures thereon to produce, save, take care of, treat,
transport, and own said products.' The lease obligates the lesee [sic] to bury all pipe lines
below ordinary plow depth when required by the lessor. The lease contains no specific
provision concerning the vertical usage of the land." Id. at 373.
The dissent attacks this by pointing out that the lease here involved grants to the
lessee ". . . any and all lands or rights and interests in land owned or claimed by lessor
adjacent or contiguous to the land above described." Thus, the lease deals expressly with
the question of the location of Getty's pumping units. Id. at 376.
25Warren Petroleum Corporation v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413
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The supreme court in the instant case rejected the mineral lessee's
principal contention that it had a right to exclusive use of the superadjacent air space above the limited surface area occupied by the
pumps and that only the lateral surface of the land should be subject

to the established rule of reasonably necessary surface usage. 25 Follow-

ing their reasoning in Brown v. Lundell,26 the majority stated: "We
now hold explicitly that the reasonably necessary limitation extends to

the superadjacent air space as well as to the lateral surface and subsurface of the land.

' 27

In Brown, the court held the mineral lessee's

liability for negligently and unnecessarily damaging the surface estate
was extended to include the subsurface. This decision, it is reasoned,

"implicitly recognized" that there are vertical as well as lateral boundaries to the use of the surface estate by the oil and gas lessee. 2 The

implication stems from the long-recognized rule that ownership of
real property includes not only the surface, but also that which lies be29
neath and above the surface.
The court in Getty sets out the proper test to be applied in determining whether the owner of the surface estate should have the right
to an accommodation in his favor when conflicting surface uses occur.
The test is whether, under all of the circumstances, the use of the
surface by the mineral lessee is reasonably necessary 0 This statement

was in response to an instruction by the trial court which erroneously
(1954); Currey v. Ingram, 397 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Austin 1953, writ ref'd nx.e.); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1958, no writ); Miller v. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, 309 S.W.2d
876, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, no writ).
24 In connection with the due regard concept and the principal case, there is authority
that the lessee should avoid using the premises in such a way as to injure things on the
surface such as crops. Cf. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160,
254 S.W. 290 (1923); Currey v. Ingrain, 397 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The due regard concept raises the question of where lies the burden of
proof. The position of the RySrATEMENT OF TORTS is that one who asserts that he is not
liable because of the consent of the owner has the burden of proving this consent to the
conduct committed. Therefore there is some logic in placing the burden of proof upon
the lessee to prove a reasonable necessity and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has so held in,
at least, one case. This is the minority position, however. See generally Keeton and Jones,
Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1956). Contra, Humble
Oil & Refining Company v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 123, 134 (Tex. Sup. 1967); Robinson
Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, no writ); Keeton
and Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1956); cf.
Warren Petroleum Corporation v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954). Thus,
Texas along with the majority has applied the general rule that, in order to recover from
the mineral lessee for damage done to the surface estate, the surface owner has the burden
of pleading and proving either specific acts of negligence or that more land was used than
was reasonably necessary.
25 Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 374 (May 26, 1971).
26 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961).
27 Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 374 (May 26, 1971).
28 Id.
29 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946); Getty Oil
Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 374 (May 26, 1971) (cases cited therein).
30 Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 372, 375 (May 26, 1971).
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called for a weighing of harm or inconvenience to Jones, the surface
owner, against the considerations pertaining to Getty, the mineral
lessee. 3 1 The court applied the test to the facts in the principal case
by allowing Jones to show that Getty's use of the surface was unreasonable in that reasonable alternatives were available to him. Similarly, it was shown that alternatives were not available to Jones which
were reasonable under all the circumstances. Therefore, the court held
that Getty should be enjoined from his present use in favor of one of the
reasonable alternatives available to him which would not interfere and
preclude Jones' surface use.
The "due regard" concept was considered in Getty as a principle
which establishes the idea of an accommodation of conflicting interests
under appropriate circumstances. The concept was applied as follows:
"... where there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where there are alternatives
available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rule
of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee."8 2 It may be argued logically that the reasonable
necessity rule as applied to the lessee, and the due regard concept which
involves a consideration of the surface owner's position are diametrically opposed. The lessee's liability is based upon an unreasonable
usage or a negligent one. The "due regard" concept may mean nothing more than a restatement of this well-established rule. If this reasoning is followed, a consideration of the surface owner's position or usage
is not involved. But, it may also mean that the accommodation element
between the parties is the decisive factor and not the rule of negligence
or unreasonableness as applied only to the mineral lessee. The dissenting opinion seems to recognize this contradiction when it points out that
Jones does not charge Getty with negligence nor does Jones contend
that Getty is using more surface than necessary. Thus, the "due regard"
aspect of Getty might be most important when applied in the future
because of a heretofore unrecognized consideration of the surface
owner's position or usage.
The opinion on motion for rehearing 33 makes clear the court's
position that the reasonableness of a surface use by the lessee is to be
determined by a consideration of the circumstances of both the mineral lessee and the surface owner. This is a recognition and approval
of the "due regard" concept in a manner that far exceeds the mere lip
service paid to the concept in the past. It is also pointed out that "the
issue is (not) a question of inconvenience to the surface owner. ' 8 4
31 Id. at 375.
32 Id. at 374.
83 Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 14 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 484 (July 28, 1971).
34 Id. at 484.
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